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Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy by Daniel J. Mahoney

Daniel J. Mahoney

Conservatism, Democracy,
and Foreign Policy
I

n a penetrating essay dating from 1948,
the Hungarian political philosopher Aurel
Kolnai wrote that in our time, a balanced
defense of liberty should aim “to displace the
spiritual stress from the ‘common man’ aspect of Democracy to its aspect of constitutionalism and of moral continuity with the
high tradition of Antiquity, Christendom,
and the half-surviving Liberal cultures of
yesterday.”1 Kolnai’s profoundly conservative appreciation of the moral foundations of democracy provides a principled
ground for resisting what Roger Scruton
has called “the culture of repudiation” and
for making one’s way in the culture wars.
Kolani’s thought can also provide inspiration for a principled and prudent foreign
policy that does not confuse a robust defense of liberty with doctrinaire support for
democracy abroad. An early critic of both
National Socialism and Soviet Communism, Kolnai knew that the Western world
has every reason to consider totalitarianism the summum malum, the worst political evil. But a variety of legitimate antitotalitarian political options exist even in a
“democratic” age. In foreign policy, the
intellectual alternatives are not exhausted
by cultural relativism, on the one hand,
and a democratic “progressivism” that overlooks the fragility of political civilization,
on the other.

In my view, the West’s victory over Communism is best understood not as a victory
for democracy per se—especially not for
democracy in its current, post-national and
post-religious manifestation—but rather,
as a defeat for the utopian illusion that
human beings could somehow live free and
dignified lives without property, religion,
nations, or politics. The collapse of Soviet
Communism was thus the definitive repudiation of what the Hegelio-Marxist philosopher Alexandre Kojève called “the universal and homogenous state.” Kojève believed that by the mid-twentieth century
the avant-garde of humanity had put “an
end to history,” to all world-transforming
political or ideological contestation.
Henceforth, there would be no politics,
only the administration of things, whether
by Communist commissars or E.U. bureaucrats. This was history’s inevitable denouement. These fantasies ought to have
been revealed for what they were by the
annus mirabilis 1989.
Yet such is the hold of historicism on us
that politicians and theorists across the
ideological spectrum succumbed to the
Daniel J. Mahoney is Professor of Political Science at
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temptation to give a “progressivist” interpretation of the end of the Cold War itself.
Marvelously mirroring Marxist arguments,
lifelong anti-Communists now claimed that
it was the West’s victory in the Cold War
that had been inevitable, that Communism
was destined to collapse because it had been
“on the wrong side of History.” In his address to the British parliament in 1982,
Ronald Reagan had stated that “the Soviet
Union...runs against the tide of history by
denying freedom and human dignity to its
citizens.” Surely this noble statesman was
correct that Communism entailed nothing
less than a fundamental assault on “the
natural order of things.” But it was another
matter to turn the tables on the Marxists by
claiming that “History” favored the universal triumph of the democratic ideal.
With the systematic breakdown of classical
and Christian education in the Western
world, few were still capable of articulating
an older wisdom that refused to identify the
Good with the alleged movement of History.
With the publication of Francis
Fukuyama’s article “The End of History?”
in The National Interest in 1989 (and the
book which quickly followed on its heels),
the world was treated to a sophisticated
neo-“Marxist” interpretation of the fall of
Communism, this time at the service of a
broadly conservative politics. According
to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War had
indeed culminated in something like the
“universal and homogenous state.” But in
one of those displays of dialectical cleverness beloved by social theorists, democratic
capitalism was now said to alone embody
the authentic “recognition of man by man.”
In a “Ruse of Reason” worthy of Hegel
himself, History had vindicated the bourgeois order whose doom had been prophesied by a century and a half of “progressive” thought.
Fukuyama’s thesis gave powerful impe4

tus to what can be called the “second
neoconservatism,” an intellectual current
that wished to follow up the defeat of Communism with vigorous support for a “global democratic revolution” aided and sustained by the military and political power
of the United States. The first neoconservatism, in contrast to the second, had
been more anti-totalitarian than “democratic” in orientation, and was perfectly
willing to acknowledge the sheer intractability of cultures and civilizations. Whatever the intellectual pedigree of some of its
adherents, the new neoconservatism owed
more to Alexandre Kojève than to Leo
Strauss, who had been an unremitting critic
of the “universal and homogenous state” in
all its forms. The new neoconservatism
shared few of the older neoconservatism’s
concerns about the pernicious spiritual and
cultural effects of a fully “democratized”
polity and culture (see almost any essay by
Irving Kristol from the 1970s) or its hesitations about dogmatic support for human
rights in foreign policy (the locus classicus of
this position is Jeane J. Kirkpatrick’s important 1979 Commentary essay, “Dictatorships and Double Standards”).
Fukuyama’s Indictment
In his latest book, America at the Crossroads:
Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative
Legacy (Yale, 2006), Fukuyama ignores his
own role in the genesis of the “second
neoconservatism.” In important respects,
the present-day partisans of “muscular
Wilsonianism” have built upon Fukuyaman
premises about “the end of history” and the
unchallenged ideological ascendancy of liberal democracy, even if they have emphasized the efficacy of military power more
than Fukuyama now thinks prudent. In his
current self-presentation, Fukuyama plays
Marx to William Kristol’s Lenin. He defends the desirability and ultimate inevitability of global democratization while criti-
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cizing ill-advised efforts to push the process
along. He sees himself as the true
neoconservative, one who has remained
faithful to neoconservatism’s original critique of large-scale social engineering and
its salutary concern about the unintended
consequences of social action. In his new
book and in the Postscript to the 2006 edition of The End of History and the Last Man,
Fukuyama defends a relatively uncontroversial version of modernization theory
that owes more to Tocqueville and Weber
than to Kojève. He claims that he “never
posited a strong version of modernization
theory, with rigid stages of development or
economically determined outcomes. Contingency, leadership, and ideas always play
a complicating role, which made major
setbacks possible if not likely.”
There is an element of truth, as well as
much bad faith, in these formulations. The
second neoconservatism is, to be sure, more
activist than anything suggested in
Fukuyama’s original speculations about
the nature of the post-Cold War world. But
just as Leninist voluntarism—the revolutionary effort to give History a shove toward its ultimate destination—was a natural consequence of Marx’s own philosophy
of history, so Fukuyama’s announcement
of the ideological triumph of liberal democracy was bound to provide inspiration
for what was to become the second
neoconservatism. Fukuyama cannot evade
responsibility for his decisive role in interpreting the collapse of Communism in an
essentially progressivist or historicist light.
It is also difficult to understand why
Fukuyama needed to resort to an obscure
mélange of Hegel and Kojève, or to rhetoric
about the “end of history,” if all he had in
mind from the beginning was a relatively
innocuous version of modernization
theory. This born-again Tocquevillian now
more carefully distinguishes between economic and social modernization (which

indeed has something “irresistible” about
it) and political liberty, which can never
simply be guaranteed by unfolding historical or social processes. To make that distinction, however, is to deny any essential
identification of modernization with “the
end of history.” It is to affirm with
Tocqueville and the classics that the political problem is in principle unsolvable, that
History can never substitute for the imperative for human beings “to put reasons
and actions in common,” as Aristotle put it.
In addition to his failure to appreciate
the tendentious logic of his own position,
Fukuyama’s attribution of real or even
metaphorical Leninism both to the Bush
administration and to contemporary
neoconservatives is unjust and irresponsible. It muddies the theoretical waters while
adding nothing to our understanding of
the real alternatives facing citizens and
statesmen today. Leninism entailed a selfconscious abrogation of the moral law in
the name of a revolutionary project to create a New Man and a New Society. It was a
manifestation of an inhuman ideological
impulse that Edmund Burke did not hesitate to call (in different historical circumstances) “metaphysical madness.” Leninism
inevitably gave rise to totalitarianism because its ends were contra naturum and
because it provided ideological justification for tyranny and terror on a truly unprecedented scale. Neoconservatives such
as William Kristol may overstate the universal appeal of “democracy” and the role
that American power can play in promoting it around the world. That is surely a
question for debate and discussion. But
they are decent men who have never claimed
that moral considerations can be suspended
in pursuit of utopian ends.
Moreover, the neoconservatives are
wrestling with a real problem made more
pressing by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—namely, the multiple ways in
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which social stagnation and political
authoritarianism conspire to reinforce fanaticism throughout the Arab Islamic
world. And however “muscular” their approach to foreign policy, they have not
advocated the indiscriminate use of military power or succumbed to the illusion
that democracy can simply be imposed from
“the barrel of a gun.” To suggest otherwise
is to engage in wild caricatures of a serious,
if flawed, approach to the conduct of American foreign policy.
There is thus something unhinged about
John Gray’s recent suggestion in the pages
of The American Interest (Summer 2006)
that “neoconservatism” represents the continuation of the Marxist-Leninist project
and that it will inevitably lead to the same
tragic consequences. These extreme formulations—worthy of an ideologue and not a
political philosopher—would be easy to
dismiss if they did not also recur with alarming regularity in “realist” and “paleoconservative” criticisms of neoconservatism in
general, and the Bush foreign policy in
particular. President Bush is the first conservative president to be regularly castigated as a “Jacobin” and “Leninist” by a
significant number of critics within the conservative intellectual community. Such
criticisms paradoxically obscure the genuine weaknesses of the Bush Doctrine by
attributing mere fanaticism to a foreign
policy that in truth has equal measures of
strength and weakness.
A Neoconservative Foreign Policy?
The critics of current American foreign
policy tend to presuppose that the Bush
administration is carrying out a plan of
action that was designed in advance by
neoconservative intellectuals. In this view,
President Bush is somehow a captive of a
cabal of ex-Leftist Jewish intellectuals, students of Leo Strauss, and a group of writers
and thinkers around William Kristol’s
6

Weekly Standard. It is conveniently forgotten or ignored that none of the principals in
the administration is a neoconservative—
with the arguable exception of Vice President Cheney, who indeed moved closer to
neoconservative positions during his tenure at the American Enterprise Institute in
the 1990s. It must be remembered that
neoconservative advocates of a militarily
assertive neo-Wilsonian foreign policy were
initially wary of George W. Bush and tended
to support the internationalist John
McCain in the 2000 Republican primaries.
As a candidate, Bush repeatedly expressed
his suspicion of humanitarian interventions abroad and called for greater “humility” in the conduct of American foreign
policy. The first eight months of the Bush
Presidency were dedicated to a domestic
agenda of “compassionate conservatism”
centered around education reform and
“faith-based initiatives.” Bush’s initial instincts about foreign policy—he did not
articulate anything as systematic as a doctrine or a grand strategy—were undoubtedly unilateralist, but they were by no means
unduly interventionist. In this regard at
least, 9/11 did indeed “change everything.”
Bush never became a neoconservative—
he operates too much on an instinctual
plane to join an intellectual party of any
sort—but he formed a tactical alliance with
those who provided a theoretical rationale
for a more assertive foreign policy. The socalled Bush Doctrine “called for offensive
operations, including preemptive war,
against terrorists and their abetters, more
specifically, against the regimes that had
sponsored, encouraged, or merely tolerated, any ‘terrorist group of global reach.’”2
If preemptive action (not necessarily of a
military sort) against terror-supporting
“rogue states” was the weapon of choice of
the new strategic doctrine, the promotion
of democratic “regime change” provided
the moral compass for a foreign policy that
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aimed to take the fight to an unscrupulous cal religions of the twentieth century. Whatand nihilistic enemy. Its proponents vigor- ever the differences between the “pious cruously defended support for democratic elty” of the Islamists and the atheistic tyrantransformation in the Middle East as a new nies of the twentieth century, both ideokind of realism rather than an ideological logical currents disdained bourgeois decrusade motivated by abstract or utopian mocracy and repudiated the moral law in
the name of ostensibly more sublime aspiconsiderations.
It is hard to deny that this overall project rations and goals. In his latest book, howis informed by a strong dose of realism and ever, Fukuyama rightfully questions
contains no small element of daring and whether Islamism poses the same kind of
“existential threat” to Western
moral nobility. For too long
civilization that was posed by
the United States coddled corCommunism and Nazism.
rupt, autocratic regimes in the
With its open contempt for raMiddle East as long as they kept
tionality, civil society, and orthe oil flowing or served our
dinary morality, and its disdain
strategic interests. The new apfor less virulent currents of Isproach provided a comprehenlam, Jihadist extremism mainly
sive framework for navigating
appeals to the marginal and disthe post-9/11 world and a sense
U.S. Soldiers in Iraq
located, to those who have been
of mission to an America that
had been awakened from her somnolence uprooted by the whirlwinds of globalizaby the surprise assault on our national soil. tion. It will never attract the sympathy of
President Bush was no doubt inspired by Western intellectuals as Communism did
the idea of striking at the very sources of during the long social crisis that dominated
tyranny and terror in the Arab Islamic the first half of the twentieth century. The
world. But his decency and respect for com- West must prepare itself for a protracted
mon humanity, undeniable virtues in a struggle with a fanatical international
democratic statesman, led him to exagger- movement that aspires to force the whole of
ate the prospects for self-government in a humanity to live within “the house of Isregion where secular and religious lam.” With such a movement there can be
authoritarianism too often compete to no compromise or negotiated settlement.
shape the destiny of peoples. In addition, Still, it is difficult to argue that in this
President Bush is a moralist who clearly struggle the West’s very existence—or the
relishes an unequivocal confrontation with moral legitimacy of liberal democracy—is
political evil. He is inclined to see any quali- genuinely at stake.
To be sure, any adequate response to the
fication of doctrinaire universalism as a
choice for “relativism” rather than a salu- terrorist threat demands a mixture of civic
tary recognition of the undeniable fact that and martial fortitude and political dexterself-government has crucial historical, ity that goes far beyond the anemic police
moral, cultural, and spiritual prerequi- measures favored by quasi-pacifistic Europeans today. But inexact talk about an
sites.
open-ended “war on terror”—which in
Strengths & Limits of the New Approach truth implies war without end—does not
The Bush administration is not wrong, of adequately convey the unsettling gray zone
course, to recognize important parallels between war and peace that will characterbetween Jihadist radicalism and the politi- ize the international situation for the foreTHE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW—Fall 2006
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seeable future. Nor is it self-evident that
democracy, especially electoral democracy,
can provide the antidote to the Islamist
virus.
After 9/11 the Bush administration lost
an opportunity to articulate a textured
anti-totalitarianism on the model of the
old neoconservatism, one that combined
principled opposition to despotism with a
carefully calibrated politics of prudence.
Instead, President Bush increasingly defined the global political alternatives in a
starkly Manichean way as a choice between
democracy and tyranny. His understanding of the contemporary world rests on a
doctrinaire political science that in the end
recognizes one and only one path to human
freedom and flourishing. This is the downside of a positive feature. As we have seen
over the past five years, Bush’s clear-sighted
recognition of Good and Evil is the major
source of his principled tough-mindedness
as a statesman. He is to be applauded for his
ability to forthrightly name the enemy (and
to recognize that the West continues to
confront deadly enemies) in a democratic
world that is increasingly prone to take for
granted the spiritual unity of the human
race. But this admirable clarity about the
moral dimensions of the struggle also leads
the President to be too dismissive of the
gray middle ground that more often than
not defines the art of statecraft. Bush and
his neoconservative allies paradoxically
share no small measure of the humanitarianism that they rightly castigate when it
emanates from anti-political European and
American leftist intellectuals.
It should be acknowledged that the Bush
administration’s instincts and policies are
often significantly more prudent than its
official rhetoric and doctrine suggest. The
administration has no doubt been chastened by the difficulty of pacifying Iraq and
of introducing lawful government in a country wracked by tribal passions and sectar8

ian divisions. Through bitter experience, it
has come to appreciate the profound difficulties entailed in bringing self-government
to another people, especially one that has
been deeply scarred by despotism and is
bereft of a settled national consciousness.
The administration surely has arrived at a
more sober appreciation of the sheer intractability of a part of the world deeply
rooted in spiritual sources that are alien to
the Western experience. Contrary to what
its more fevered critics suggest, it has no
stomach for organizing a global democratic imperium or embarking on new “wars
of choice.” While the administration continues to put too much emphasis on the
centrality of electoral democracy, it knows
how to work with “authoritarian” allies
who oppose Islamist fanaticism or who, in
its judgment, provide the best hope for
political stability and gradual liberalization.
Conservatism and the
Rhetoric of Democracy
But the administration’s official rhetoric
continues to be marred by a tendency to
treat modern democracy as a self-evident
desideratum, even as the regime “according to nature.” As friendly critics such as
Fareed Zakharia have pointed out, both
the administration and its neoconservative
allies woefully underestimate the despotic
propensities inherent in electoral democracy, and this despite the rising electoral
fortunes of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in the Middle
East and of a Leftist authoritarian like Hugo
Chavez in Latin America. They continue to
speak ritualistically about “democracy”
when what they must really have in mind is
that complex synthesis of the rule of law,
constitutionalism, federalism, and representative government that Zakharia calls
“constitutional liberalism.” Their “democratic” monomania marks a break with an
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older conservative tradition which always
insisted that Western liberty draws on intellectual and spiritual resources broader
and deeper than that of modern democracy. The idioms of constitutionalism and
representative government have little room
in a doctrine that places such inordinate
emphasis on the love of liberty in the human soul and its natural expression through
majority votes.
Critics who raise perfectly legitimate and
necessary questions about the cultural prerequisites of democratic self-government
are summarily dismissed by President Bush
or Prime Minister Blair as cultural relativists, or even as racists—as if “democracy”
arises automatically once impediments are
removed. As ominously, the partisans of
“global democracy” turn a blind eye to the
historical evidence that suggests it is not
from authoritarian regimes, but from weak
and fledgling “democracies,” that totalitarianism arises: consider Russia in 1917,
Italy in 1922, and Germany in 1933.3 The
best conservative thinkers of the last two
centuries have been wary of unalloyed democracy precisely because they cared deeply
about the preservation of human liberty
and recognized the powerful affinities between mass democracy and modern totalitarianism. There are totalitarian propensities inherent in what the French political
philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel once
called “sovereignty in itself”: the illusion
that the “sovereign” human will is the ultimate arbiter of the moral and political
world.
We are confronted, then, with a foreign
policy that in many respects operates within
sober parameters of principle and prudence—but which is expressed in a selfdefeating rhetoric that both encourages
overreach and leaves the administration
vulnerable to tendentious criticism. When
the administration works with moderate
pro-American autocrats such as General

Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan it is inevitably accused of hypocrisy. Putting inordinate stress on the necessity of building democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan—rather
than speaking more modestly about
strengthening lawful and representative
institutions in both countries—creates
unreasonable expectations that are bound
to be disappointed. Such “democracy”
rhetoric also disarms the United States’
legitimate concerns about religious extremism (e.g. the imposition of Sharia) when it
is legitimized through the electoral process. Who are we to challenge the sovereignty of a democratic people? A more calibrated rhetoric, one that emphasizes the
need to gradually introduce lawful and
non-despotic political orders in countries
ravaged by despotism or beset by corruption and authoritarianism would be less
dramatic and perhaps less inspiring. But it
would better describe the more modest and
often quite realistic hopes that drive actual
American policy in countries such as Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Excessively doctrinaire rhetoric about
democracy also creates misplaced pressures
to confront non-totalitarian regimes, such
as Vladimir Putin’s Russia, with demands
for “liberalization” that have nothing to do
with America’s legitimate national interests and everything to do with the view that
Western-style liberal democracy provides
the only legitimate model for political development in our time. This necessarily
puts the administration in binds. The VicePresident of the United States followed up
a May 4, 2006, speech in Vilnius, Lithuania—
one which implicitly threatened Russia with
a “color revolution” of its own if it did not
move in a more “democratic” direction—
with trips to Kazakhstan and Khirgistan to
do business with the local tyrants. Such a
brazen act of double-dealing confirms the
suspicions of skeptics who are already convinced that American “universalism” is little
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more than a cover for national egoism and
will-to-power. The spirited resistance to
tyranny that has been the hallmark of administration rhetoric since 9/11 needs to be
moderated and complemented by a greater
awareness of local conditions and a greater
modesty about America’s capacity to
judge—and dictate—the appropriate conditions for self-government abroad. In
Russia, “National Bolsheviks” of the most
unsavory sort, not Western-style liberals,
are the real alternative to Putin’s comparatively liberal regime.
And in truth, the vituperative exchanges
between neoconservatives and paleoconservatives, and between foreign policy “realists” and “idealists,” do little to contribute to the articulation of a politics of prudence worthy of the name. Both the administration and the full array of American
conservative intellectuals need to learn how
to judiciously combine spiritedness and
moderation, Churchillian fortitude and
prudent self-restraint, in a way that does
justice to the perils that stem from both too
much and too little national self-assertion.
The Second Inaugural:
Nature, History, and the Human Soul
The democratic universalism of the Bush
Doctrine is expressed with particular lucidity in the Second Inaugural Address delivered by the President on January 21, 2005.
That speech is the best single articulation of
the moral and philosophical premises underlying contemporary American foreign
policy—or at least of the official doctrine
that animates it. But it also reveals some of
the deeply problematic assumptions informing the administration’s policy “to
seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world.” That heady
goal is presented as a fully practical ideal
even if Bush conceded on that occasion that
10

it is likely to be the “concentrated work of
generations.” That perfunctory concession
to gradualism in no way qualifies the
President’s “complete confidence in the
eventual triumph of freedom” or his belief
that democracy, and democracy alone, is
the regime that most fully coheres with the
nature and needs of human beings. For
President Bush, democracy has the support
of the deepest longings of the human soul
and of a Providential God who is also the
“Author of Liberty.”
To be sure, President Bush acknowledges
that democracy can take a variety of local
or cultural expressions. He denies that the
United States has any interest in “impos(ing)
our own style of government on the unwilling.” Still, he fully identifies democracy as a
political form with the imperative of selfgovernment. Whatever latitude is left to
citizens and statesmen has to do with the
kind of democracy that will protect human
rights and human dignity within particular historical or cultural settings. President
Bush implicitly affirms that the whole of
humanity should and will eventually live
under the liberal democratic dispensation.
To that extent at least, he shares the
Kojèvean-Fukuyaman premise that the
“mutual recognition” of man by man will
inevitably culminate in a “universal and
homogenous state.”
In the Second Inaugural, Bush speaks
grandiloquently about “the global appeal
of liberty” and makes no distinction between support for liberty and the promotion of a rather ill-defined “democracy.”
The President simply ignores or disregards
everything in modern historical experience
that suggests that modernization is compatible with various forms of “democratic
despotism.” The defeat of Communism is
interpreted as definitive proof that “the
world is moving toward liberty,” since “the
call of freedom comes to every mind and
every soul.”
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In his quite complimentary remarks to
the people of Hungary delivered on June
22, 2006, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, President Bush makes a similar claim that, “the
desire for liberty is universal, because it is
written by our Creator into the hearts of
every man, woman, and child on the Earth.”
In this speech, Bush pays eloquent tribute
to the noble struggle of Hungarians in 1956,
all the while treating that “anti-totalitarian revolution” (as Raymond Aron called it
at the time), that collective revolt against
the ideological “lie,” as evidence of the inevitable triumph of democracy over “dictatorship.” In doing so, however, he risks
rendering that great event banal by turning
it into one more illustration of the “Whig”
version of history. The specificity of Communist totalitarianism, the Christian and
European character of the Hungarian
people, and the fact that Hungarians themselves took the initiative to restore their
national independence and the authentic
meaning of words are all overlooked in this
rendering of events. The Hungarian Revolution instead becomes raw material for the
inevitable victory of democracy in every
time and place.
As hortatory rhetoric, the President’s
words are undoubtedly stirring and even
ennobling. As political reflection, they reveal a shallow understanding of the complex passions, interests, and motives that
move human beings. President Bush dogmatically presupposes that love of liberty is
the predominant, even the overarching
motive of the human soul. He not only
downplays the cultural prerequisites of
ordered liberty or democratic self-government but abstracts from the sempiternal
drama of good and evil in each and every
human soul. The President’s unqualified
universalism abstracts from the fact that
hatred of despotism by no means automatically translates into love of liberty or a

settled and disciplined capacity for selfgovernment. It ignores Tocqueville’s profound insight that the pure love of liberty—
the passion for political freedom and of
“government of God and the laws alone”—
is a “sublime taste” reserved for a few souls
and incomprehensible to “mediocre” ones.4
To be sure, Bush sometimes recurs to the
best conservative wisdom and acknowledges that self-government necessarily entails “the governing of the self.” He rightly
asserts that human rights are “ennobled by
service, and mercy.” But he more characteristically makes extravagant claims about
love of liberty being the incontestable motive of thinking and acting man. As Charles
Kesler has observed, Bush ignores the palpable fact that while “‘people everywhere
prefer freedom to slavery’...many people
everywhere and at all times have been quite
happy to enjoy their freedom and all the
benefits of someone else’s slavery.”5 Selfgovernment is a disposition of the soul that
finds powerful support in the soul’s refusal
to be tyrannized by others. But the two are
not equivalent. President Bush is not wrong
when he argues that despotism violates the
moral law and mutilates the wellsprings of
the human spirit. But he is too quick to
identify human nature with a single
overarching impulse or desire, and he goes
too far in conflating the ways of Providence
with the empire of human liberty.
Near the end of the Second Inaugural,
Bush anticipates some of these criticisms.
While continuing to express “complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom” he attempts to distance himself from
arguments about historical inevitability.
“History” by itself determines nothing. Instead, our confidence in the universal triumph of liberty must be rooted in the fact
that freedom is the “permanent hope of
mankind” and the most powerful “longing
of the soul.” These poetic invocations do
not adequately take into account the decid-
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edly “mixed” character of human nature.
The President should not be expected, of
course, to speak with the precision of a
political philosopher. Still, this President
of deep Christian conviction paradoxically
shows little appreciation for the tragic dimensions of history and the pernicious and
permanent effects of original sin on individual and collective life.
Humanitarian Democracy
versus the United States
Moreover, the reduction of the political
problem to the categorical imperative of
promoting democracy abroad leaves the
administration and the country vulnerable to those on the Left who identify democracy with a project to emancipate human beings from traditional cultural,
moral, and even political restraints. For
the partisans of “postmodern” or “humanitarian” democracy, the United States falls
far short of the “democratic ideal.” As the
French political philosopher Pierre Manent
has recently written, European elites “are
trying to separate their democratic virtue
from all their other characteristics,” such as
tradition, religion, and especially from the
political framework of the nation-state.
They have succumbed to what might be
called the “postpolitical temptation.” At
the same time, “Americans seem more than
ever willing—and this disposition extends
well beyond the partisans of the current
administration—to identify everything they
do and everything they are with democracy, as such.”6 But what is to prevent the
partisans of humanitarian democracy from
denying the democratic bona fides of a selfgoverning people that remains attached to
national sovereignty and still acknowledges
the importance of traditional arrangements
to a regime of self-government? By validating democracy as the alpha and omega of
politics in our time, the Bush Doctrine
leaves America vulnerable to delegit12

imization at the hands of more radical and
“consistent” forms of democratic affirmation. In any case, deference to humanizing
universal moral and political truths in no
way means that any particular country
gives humanity unmediated access to the
universal. Abraham Lincoln, the noble
poet-statesman of the American experiment, beautifully captured this tension
when he spoke of Americans as an “almostchosen people.” The United States (and the
Western world in general) would cease to
be true to itself if it repudiated the universality of its principles. But America surely
also owes much of its greatness to particular national characteristics, to what Orestes
Brownson has suggestively called our
“providential constitution.” Otherwise
America is in principle “the world,” the
prototype of a unified humanity, and is
destined to be swallowed up by a global
imperium that more fully embodies the
“democratic” aspirations of the whole of
mankind.
President Bush may not be a neoconservative in any narrow political or even
ideological sense. But his Second Inaugural
Address perfectly mirrors the contradictions at the heart of the second neoconservatism. Like President Bush, neoconservatives are proud defenders of the prerogatives of the United States as a free,
independent, and self-governing national
community. At the same time, they are
deeply suspicious of any other national selfassertion, however moderate or humane,
that declines to “identify American democracy with the universal as such.”7 At the
rhetorical level at least, the second
neoconservatism and the partisans of European humanitarian democracy ultimately differ more about means than ends.
They are “frères-ennemis” who promote
two distinct paths to the same destination,
the “universal and homogenous state.”
As I have tried to suggest, neocon-
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servatism’s misplaced one-sided emphasis
on democracy may be more the rhetorical
scaffolding than the heart and soul of
neoconservative wisdom. But this democratic monomania acts as an acid, eating
away at the coherence of a current of thought
whose patriotism, good will, and commitment to the cause of liberty should in no
way be doubted. Alas, it cannot provide the
basis for a politics of prudence in our time.
1. See Aurel Kolnai, “The Meaning of the ‘Common
Man’,” in Kolnai, Privilege and Liberty, ed. by D.

Mahoney (Lexington Books, 1999), 64.
2. Charles Kesler, “Democracy and the Bush Doctrine,” Claremont Review of Books (Vol. V, Number 1,
Winter 2004), 18.
3. This point was central to Charles de Gaulle’s famous
“Bayeux address” of June 16, 1946.
4. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the
Regime, trans. by Alan S. Kahan (University of Chicago
Press, 1998), Book Three, Chapter Three, 217.
5. Kesler, 20.
6. Pierre Manent, A World Beyond Politics?: A Defense
of the Nation-State, trans. by Marc LePain (Princeton
University Press, 2006), viii.
7. Ibid.
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